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I never felt so much like a hooker down by the bus station in any race 
I’ve ever been in as I did in a judicial race.  Everyone interested in 
contributing has very specific interests.  They mean to be buying a vote.  
Whether they succeed or not, it’s hard to say.  
    − Ohio Supreme Court Justice Paul E. Pfeiffer1 
                                                                 
* J.D. 2009, Cleveland State University, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law.  An earlier 
version of this Note won First Prize in the American College of Trial Lawyers’ 2007 Law 
Student Essay contest.  I wish to thank Professors Stephen Gard (of the Cleveland-Marshall 
College of Law) and Charles Gardner Geyh (of the Indiana University School of Law) for 
helpful suggestions and discussion.  All errors remain my own. 
1 Adam Liptak & Janet Roberts, Campaign Cash Mirrors a High Court’s Rulings, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 1, 2006, at A1.   
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Model Code of Judicial Conduct states, “A judge shall disqualify himself or 
herself in a proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be 
questioned, including . . . instances where: . . .  [t]he judge has a personal bias or 
prejudice concerning a party.”2  No modern issue in legal ethics raises more 
questions than how judges are chosen and how well such judges do their jobs.3  
States that retain judicial elections increasingly will be called upon to reconcile 
judges’ expanding free-speech rights with litigants’ due process right to an impartial 
judge.  The goal of this Note is to address these constitutional rights in the context of 
the Framers’ conception of the separation of powers.  
The Framers of the Constitution would be unlikely to recognize most states’ 
current judicial landscape.  No judges were elected for the first fifty years of our 
nation’s history, whereas thirty-nine states currently elect at least some of their 
judges.4  In 1788, Alexander Hamilton wrote in Federalist Paper No. 78 that “[t]he 
complete independence of the courts of justice is peculiarly essential” under the 
separation of powers.5  By “separation of powers” Hamilton and the Framers 
envisioned governments with limited powers, with three branches that could use 
their different powers to check those of the others.6  Hamilton called the judiciary 
“the least dangerous” branch, for it held neither the “purse” strings of the legislature 
nor the force of the executive.7  The judiciary wielded “merely judgment” that was to 
be protected from outside influence by safeguards to its independence such as 
appointment and extended tenure.8  By contrast, judges today are likely to be able to 
solicit contributions directly from the lawyers and organizations most likely to 
                                                                 
2 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(E)(1) (2007). 
3 For a comprehensive bibliography (through 1998) of resources on judicial selection, 
see Amy B. Atchison, Lawrence Tobe Liebert & Denise K. Russell, Bibliography, Judicial 
Independence and Judicial Accountability: A Selected Bibliography, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 723 
(1999).  See also Malia Reddick, Merit Selection: A Review of the Social Scientific 
Literature, 106 DICK. L. REV. 729, 729 (2002) (“As one judicial selection scholar noted, ‘It 
is fairly certain that no single subject has consumed as many pages in law reviews and law-
related publications over the past [fifty] years as the subject of judicial selection.’” (quoting 
Philip L. Dubois, Accountability, Independence, and the Selection of State Judges: The Role 
of Popular Judicial Elections, 40 SW. L.J. 31, 31 (1986))). 
4 Phyllis Williams Kotey, Public Financing for Non-Partisan Judicial Campaigns: 
Protecting Judicial Independence While Ensuring Judicial Impartiality, 38 AKRON L. REV. 
597, 602 (2004). 
5 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 292 (Alexander Hamilton) (New York, J. & A. McLean 
1788). 
6 See, e.g., Springer v. Gov’t of Phil. Is., 277 U.S. 189, 201-02 (1928) (“[U]nless 
otherwise expressly provided or incidental to the powers conferred, the legislature cannot 
exercise either executive or judicial power; the executive cannot exercise either legislative 
or judicial power; [and] the judiciary cannot exercise either executive or legislative 
power.”).  
7 THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 5, at 291. 
8 Id. 
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appear before them in court.9  Courts have recently held that judicial candidates’ 
free-speech rights extend to false or misleading statements about opponents in 
advertisements.10  In addition, candidates may make “pledges and promises” on 
issues likely to come before them in the near future.11   
Almost all contributions to judicial candidates come from attorneys and litigants 
who expect to come before those to whom they are contributing.12  Attorneys and 
litigants appear to give significant contributions to judicial candidates for one of two 
reasons: they hope the contributions will sway judges in their favor, or they seek the 
election of those with judicial philosophies attuned to their interests.13  Those who 
downplay money’s influence argue the second point—that contributors simply 
support like-minded candidates.14  Whatever a contributor’s motive, it often makes 
no difference to the litigant on the other side, whose faith in the system is dashed.15  
Individual litigants are not the only ones who feel that equal justice is subverted by 
judicial campaign contributions.  A recent Ohio poll found that nine out of ten 
citizens believe campaign contributions play a role in how judges decide cases.16  
When one side gives thousands of dollars to a judge who later hears its case, may 
that judge’s impartiality “reasonably be questioned”? 
                                                                 
9 See e.g., Carey v. Wolnitzek, No. 3:06-36-KKC, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73869 (E.D. 
Ky. Oct. 10, 2006).  
10 See Weaver v. Bonner, 309 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2002). 
11 See N.D. Family Alliance, Inc. v. Bader, 361 F. Supp. 2d 1021, 1035-37 (D.N.D. 
2005) (striking down North Dakota’s “pledge and promise” clause by equating it with the 
“announce” clause struck down in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765 
(2002)).  But see In re Kinsey, 842 So. 2d 77, 87-88 (Fla. 2003) (holding that Florida’s 
“pledges and promises” clause was narrowly tailored to protect the compelling interest in 
judicial impartiality). 
12  See Catherine Turcer & Jason Danklefsen, Contributions to Candidates for Justice of 
the Ohio Supreme Court, January 1-October 4, 2006, OHIO CITIZEN ACTION, Oct. 31, 2006, 
http://www.ohiocitizen.org/moneypolitics/2006/judicial.html (“Robert Cupp and Terrence 
O’Donnell received most of their contributions from lawyers and law firms, the insurance 
industry, and the health care field” and “Ben Espy had strong support from labor unions.”).  
13 In support of the first notion, see David Barnhizer, “On the Make”: Campaign 
Funding and the Corrupting of the American Judiciary, 50 CATH. U. L. REV. 361, 379-80 
(2001) (“The truths of the situation are simple.  Money shapes behavior.”) and Aman 
McLeod, If At First You Don’t Succeed: A Critical Evaluation of Judicial Selection Reform 
Efforts, 107 W. VA. L. REV. 499, 505 (2005).  In support of the second notion, see Glenn 
Sheller, Editorial, Politicians Don’t Sell Out Their Beliefs for Campaign Contributions, 
COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Oct. 5, 2006, at A15. 
14 Sheller, supra note 13.  
15 See Liptak & Roberts, supra note 1.  The article tells the story of an Ohio litigant who 
felt that several Ohio Supreme Court justices’ acceptances of large campaign contributions 
during trial was tantamount to accepting a bribe.  See infra Part II.B (discussing the recent 
controversy surrounding the Ohio Supreme Court). 
16 T.C. Brown, Majority of Court Rulings Favor Campaign Donors, PLAIN DEALER 
(Cleveland), Feb. 15, 2000, at A1. 
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Whatever the answer, it must come in the wake of the United States Supreme 
Court’s landmark 2009 decision in Caperton v. Massey.17  In Caperton, Justice 
Kennedy’s opinion, joined by the four-member “liberal wing” of the Court, held that 
litigants’ constitutional due process rights may be compromised when another 
litigant makes extraordinary campaign contributions to a judge who is likely to hear 
a case involving that litigant.18  This was the first time the Court had extended the 
constitutional right of due process this far.  Previously, the Court’s position was that 
a litigant’s due process rights were compromised only when the judge held “a direct, 
personal, substantial, pecuniary interest” in the case at hand.19 
The other major case that must be reckoned with is Republican Party of 
Minnesota v. White.20  In that case, the five-justice majority held that judges have the 
same free-speech protections to announce their views on disputed legal and political 
topics as candidates for other offices.21  Judges are now likely to do just that during 
campaign season.22  Since White, the pace toward more openness in the areas of 
judicial free speech and perceived “accountability” to voters has accelerated.  One 
extreme example came out of South Dakota in 2006.  Had it been successful, that 
state’s initiative, called “Jail 4 Judges,” would have ended judges’ traditional 
immunity from prosecution for their decisions on the bench.23  States that elect their 
judges have less power than ever to regulate political and electioneering speech 
during and after judicial campaigns.24   
The constitutional values of judicial free speech and judicial impartiality are in 
danger of falling out of balance.  In the post-White era, judicial candidates are 
emboldened to proclaim their views on the campaign trail, which impedes the 
appearance and reality of impartiality when deciding cases related to such matters.25  
                                                                 
17 Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009). 
18 Id. at 2265. 
19 Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927). 
20 Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002).  For a critical assessment 
of this seminal case, see Wendy R. Weiser, Regulating Judges’ Political Activity After 
White, 68 ALB. L. REV. 651 (2005).  For a positive assessment of White, see Michael R. 
Dimino, Pay No Attention to That Man Behind the Robe: Judicial Elections, the First 
Amendment, and Judges as Politicians, 21 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 301 (2003). 
21 White, 536 U.S. at 788. 
22 See, e.g., Christian Coal. of Ala. v. Cole, 355 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2004) (neglecting 
to enforce Alabama’s Judicial Inquiry Commission’s recommendation that judges not reply 
to appellants’ political questionnaire); Griffen v. Ark. Judicial Discipline & Disability 
Comm’n, 130 S.W.3d 524 (Ark. 2003) (holding that judge’s comments on race relations 
were protected free speech). 
23 Editorial, Voting for Judicial Independence, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2006, at A26. 
24 See Dennis J. Willard, Candidates in a Rematch for High Court, AKRON BEACON J., 
Oct. 18, 2006, at A1.  
25 See Robert M. O’Neil, The Canons in the Courts: Recent First Amendment Rulings, 
35 IND. L. REV. 701 (2002).  But see Erwin Chemerinsky, Restrictions on the Speech of 
Judicial Candidates are Unconstitutional, 35 IND. L. REV. 735 (2002) (arguing that if states 
choose to elect their judges, candidates’ free speech rights cannot be restricted). 
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol57/iss4/7
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Several commentators have argued that litigants’ due process rights are violated by 
the current judicial campaign finance system.26  None have argued, however, that the 
Framers’ understanding of the separation of powers requires a lower threshold for 
finding a violation of such rights.  Reclaiming the doctrine of separation of powers is 
a powerful corrective to ill-conceived notions of the fundamental role of judges.  To 
protect litigants’ due process interests in the appearance and reality of judicial 
impartiality, states have a compelling interest to restrict the flow of money into 
judicial campaigns.  For states that choose to retain judicial elections, only public 
financing will temper the appearance of partiality arising out of the current climate of 
unfettered judicial speech.  Indiana Supreme Court Justice Randall T. Shepard has 
written that “[s]ociety’s commitment to the rule of law may be irreparably damaged 
if losing litigants do not respect adverse judgments because they perceive them to 
have been rendered in biased courts.”27  
This Note consists of five Parts.  Part II traces the historical development of state 
judicial elections from the perspective of the Framers’ doctrine of separation of 
powers.  It shows that judicial elections were borne more of historical contingency 
than constitutional design.  Part II then assesses the recent history of elections to the 
Ohio Supreme Court.  It determines that Ohio’s judicial elections share two problems 
with many other states: millions of dollars given to judicial candidates by special 
interests likely to appear before the court, and candidates’ broad freedom of speech 
to earn the political and financial support of these special interests.28   Part III 
analyzes the important cases discussing judicial candidates’ free speech rights and 
litigants’ due process right to an impartial tribunal.  Further, it explores how these 
conflicting constitutional rights may be reconciled.  Part III then looks at recent cases 
where litigants or their counsels have sought judges’ recusal because of perceived 
bias.  Finally, Part III weighs the rights of judicial candidates, litigants, and 
contributors and concludes that there is a compelling state interest in severely 
limiting those of contributors by instituting full public financing of judicial 
campaigns.   
                                                                 
26 See Mark Andrew Grannis, Note, Safe Guarding the Litigant’s Constitutional Right to a 
Fair and Impartial Forum: A Due Process Approach to Improprieties Arising from Judicial 
Campaign Contributions from Lawyers, 86 MICH. L. REV. 382 (1987) (arguing that 
contributions from lawyers should be tightly regulated); Scott D. Wiener, Note, Popular 
Justice: State Judicial Elections and Procedural Due Process, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 
187 (1996) (arguing that Congress must legislate judicial elections out of existence, but not 
addressing the fact that such action is barred by the Tenth Amendment).  
27 Randall T. Shepard, Campaign Speech: Restraint and Liberty in Judicial Ethics, 9 GEO. 
J. LEGAL ETHICS 1059, 1067 (1996). 
28 In 2002, Justice-elect Maureen O’Connor said this in an election night speech: 
I can’t underestimate the influence of the medical community, the doctors of 
the state of Ohio that have been so concerned about patient access to quality medical 
treatment here in the state of Ohio.  And their efforts will pay off toward restoring 
confidence not only in our physicians and their ability to continue to treat patients 
but in our hospitals. 
Laura A. Bischoff, Stratton, O’Connor Win Ohio Supreme Court Races: Female Justices to 
be in Majority, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, Nov. 6, 2002, at A5.  This statement acknowledges 
both that the contributions “of the medical community” helped her win and that she 
intended to represent their interests from the bench.  Id.   
5Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2009
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Part IV looks at several ways in which current judicial election systems may be 
improved to bring back judicial independence and impartiality.  It argues that the 
standard of judicial recusal must be changed to require judges to bow out of many 
more cases than current practice dictates.  Part IV then sketches out the possibilities 
(and perils) of full public funding of judicial elections.  The best plan, which would 
require no taxpayer money, would allow states to retain judicial elections while 
reclaiming the Framers’ separation of powers interest in judicial independence.  Part 
V concludes this Note with alternate visions of the near future where both “worse-
case” and “better-case” scenarios have taken hold.  
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
A.  The Three Eras of State Judicial Selection 
The history of judicial selection in the United States may be divided into three 
distinct eras.  The first era ran from the Nation’s founding until 1832, the year 
Mississippi became the first state to select judges by popular vote.29  For the United 
States’ first fifty years, all state and federal judges were appointed by the other 
branches of government.30  Before our country’s independence, judges were 
appointed by the crown in England.31  In the Declaration of Independence, the 
Framers condemned England’s King George III for making “‘judges dependent on 
his will alone, for tenure of their offices, and the amount and payment of their 
salaries.’”32  The Framers modified the British system by providing in the 
Constitution that federal judges be appointed by the Executive “with the Advice and 
Consent of the Senate.”33  The Framers assumed states would formulate similar 
selection schemes, as the concept of an elected judiciary was unknown in the 
eighteenth century.34   
The Framers used the phrase “separation of powers” to describe the “checks and 
balances” that each of the three branches would exhibit on the other two in order to 
                                                                 
29 Rachel Paine Caufield, In the Wake of White: How States are Responding to 
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White and How Judicial Elections are Changing, 38 
AKRON L. REV. 625, 626-27 (2005). 
30 Symposium, The Case for Partisan Judicial Elections, 33 U. TOL. L. REV. 393, 394 
(2002). 
31 Kelley Armitage, Denial Ain’t Just a River in Egypt: A Thorough Review of Judicial 
Elections, Merit Selection and the Role of State Judges in Society, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 625, 
628 (2002). 
32 Kotey, supra note 4, at 600 (quoting THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 11 
(U.S. 1776)). 
33 U.S. CONST.  art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
34 See DeRolph v. State, 754 N.E.2d 1184, 12032-03 (Ohio 2001) (Douglas, J., 
concurring) (commenting that Ohio’s state government mirrors the Framers’ federal 
conception of the separation of powers).  Entrusting election of most judges to citizens 
appears to be uniquely American.  See G. Alan Tarr, Rethinking the Selection of State 
Supreme Court Justices, 39 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1445, 1465-66 (describing judicial 
selection methods in Western European countries). 
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol57/iss4/7
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achieve a limited, republican form of government.35  To strengthen the judicial 
branch’s standing in relation to the other branches, the Framers put two safeguards in 
place.  First, judges were appointed for life during “good behavior,” with guaranteed 
salaries.36  Alexander Hamilton noted in Federalist Paper No. 79, “[A] power over a 
man’s subsistence amounts to a power over his will.”37  The Framers, therefore, 
sought to shield judges from negative influence from the other branches of 
government.  Second, the people’s elective officials were to appoint judges, which 
would keep them free from the influence of a passionate electorate.38  Article II, 
Section 2 of the Constitution established that judges in the federal system were to be 
nominated by the Executive “with the Advice and Consent of the Senate.”39  This era 
lives on in the eleven states (including ten of the original thirteen colonies) that 
continue to appoint all of their judges.40   
In the second era of judicial selection, Jacksonian populism ushered in both a 
new way of selecting judges and a new understanding of judges’ role in society.  
President Andrew Jackson sought to radically change the republican nature of our 
system of governing.41  He wished to eliminate the Electoral College and institute the 
popular election of U.S. senators and federal judges.42  In place of the Framers’ 
concern for judicial independence, Jackson and the populists demanded political 
accountability from politicians and judges alike.43  Groups such as Ohio’s 
“Barnburners” sought to remake society, liberating “common folk” from 
stratification and elitism in the learned professions.44  Even some nineteenth-century 
judges came to support judicial elections, believing popular validation from the polls 
would rebalance growing legislative and executive branch power.45  Ironically, many 
who favor judicial elections today do so because they believe it is the best way to 
                                                                 
35 DeRolph, 754 N.E.2d at 1202-03 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
36 Kotey, supra note 4, at 599-600.   
37 THE FEDERALIST NO. 79, at 299-300 (Alexander Hamilton) (New York, J. & A. 
McLean 1788) (emphasis omitted). 
38 Kotey, supra note 4, at 600. 
39 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
40 Cristopher Rapp, Note, The Will of the People, the Independence of the Judiciary, 
and Free Speech in Judicial Elections after Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 21 J.L. 
& POL. 103, 114 n.85 (2005). 
41 Jason Miles Levien & Stacie L. Fatka, Cleaning Up Judicial Elections: Examining 
the First Amendment Limitations on Judicial Campaign Regulation, 2 MICH. L. & POL’Y 
REV. 71, 74 (1997). 
42 MICHAEL E. SOLIMINE ET AL., CTR. FOR LAW & JUSTICE AT THE UNIV. OF CINCINNATI 
COLL. OF LAW, JUDICIAL SELECTION IN OHIO: HISTORY, RECENT DEVELOPMENTS, AND AN 
ANALYSIS OF REFORM PROPOSALS 5 (2003), http://www.law.uc.edu/institutes/rosenthal/docs/ 
judseloh0309.pdf. 
43 Id. 
44 Paul D. Carrington & Adam R. Long, The Independence and Democratic 
Accountability of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 30 CAP. U. L. REV. 455, 455-57, 471 (2002). 
45 Kotey, supra note 4, at 602.   
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check judges’ power to decide cases that are contrary to their wishes.46  Those who 
tout judicial accountability believe judges need to be reined in by the will of the 
people at the ballot box.   
The third era of judicial selection has been marked by a struggle between camps 
that are legacies of the first two eras.  The first camp is trying to reclaim what it 
perceives to be judges’ lost independence and appearance of impartiality.47  The 
other camp seeks to increase state judges’ accountability to the people, so that those 
who “legislate from the bench” may be voted out if their decisions do not reflect 
majority will.  This era of conflict began in 1940 when Missouri became the first 
state to move away from elections.48  The so-called “Missouri Plan,” a modified 
judicial appointment scheme, provided for initial “merit selection” by a non-partisan 
committee followed by retention elections.49  The Missouri Plan is a compromise 
between those who favor elections to keep judges accountable and those who favor 
appointments to ensure the most qualified candidates ascend to the bench.50   
In this era, ballot measures giving citizens the chance to end judicial elections 
have routinely failed.51  Therefore, many states have taken other approaches to 
differentiate judicial elections from purely political elections.  For example, Ohio’s 
judicial ethics rule that imposed limits on expenditures for judicial candidates was 
declared unconstitutional in Suster v. Marshall.52  The Sixth Circuit said such limits 
violated Buckley v. Valeo,53 in which the United States Supreme Court declared valid 
limits on contributions but not expenditures.54  To this day, no Supreme Court 
majority has acknowledged a fundamental difference between judicial elections and 
                                                                 
46 See generally ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE 
SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (2d ed. Josephine Ann Bickel 1986) (1962).  
47 The American Bar Association, through its Standing Committee on Judicial 
Independence, has led the charge for stricter enforcement of its Model Rules of Judicial 
Conduct.  See ABA Standing Committee on Judicial Independence, 
http://www.abanet.org/judind/home.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2009).  
48 Caufield, supra note 29, at 627 n.19. 
49 See Jona Goldschmidt, Merit Selection: Current Status, Procedures, and Issues, 49 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 1, 50-51 (1994).  “Merit selection” denotes a system where prominent 
lawyers, judges, legislators, or community members nominate candidates for open 
judgeships.  Id. at 2.  The final choice is then made by an executive committee, the state’s 
legislature, or the governor.  Id. 
50 See Marie A. Failinger, Can a Good Judge Be a Good Politician? Judicial Elections 
from a Virtue Ethics Approach, 70 MO. L. REV. 433, 443-45 (2005). 
51 Kathy Bushouse, County to Keep Electing Judges, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, Nov. 8, 
2000, at B6; William Glaberson, Lawyers’ Study Says States Should Pay for Court Races, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2001, at A10; Editorial, Moyer Continues Fight: Chief Justice Hasn’t 
Flagged in Effort to Increase Respect for the Ohio Supreme Court, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, 
Nov. 13, 2002, at A12. 
52 Suster v. Marshall, 149 F.3d 523 (6th Cir. 1998). 
53 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
54 Id. at 15-23. 
8https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol57/iss4/7
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other kinds of elections.55   Most recently, Wisconsin and North Carolina have had 
some success with publicly-funded judicial elections.56            
While many in this third era have sought a return to the Framers’ separation of 
powers model of judicial independence, others have labored to secure the same level 
of free speech for judicial candidates as candidates for political offices have always 
enjoyed.57  This camp won a decisive victory in 2002 when the United States 
Supreme Court decided Republican Party of Minnesota v. White.58  This seminal 
case struck down, on free-speech grounds, Minnesota’s ethics rule prohibiting 
judicial candidates from announcing their views on contested legal issues.59  Since 
that time, several lower federal courts have relied on expansive interpretations of 
White to strike down state rules that prohibit judicial candidates from personally 
soliciting campaign contributions60 or making “pledges or promises” regarding their 
future conduct on the bench.61  At the same time, many judges,62 scholars,63 and 
                                                                 
55 Barnhizer, supra note 13, at 410 (“Suster offered the opportunity to establish a 
different standard for judicial campaigns, but the federal courts chose to find no compelling 
difference between judicial and legislative races of a kind sufficient to allow limits on 
campaign expenditures.”).   
56 See infra Part IV.C for further discussion of North Carolina’s and Wisconsin’s efforts 
to institute public funding of judicial elections. 
57 For positive assessments of expansive judicial candidate free speech, see 
Chemerinsky, supra note 25, and Michael R. Dimino, Sr., The Worst Way of Selecting 
Judges—Except All the Others That Have Been Tried, 32 N. KY. L. REV. 267 (2005). 
58 See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002).  
59 Id. at 788. 
60 See Carey v. Wolnitzek, No. 3:306-36-KKC, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73869, at *3 
(E.D. Ky. Oct. 10, 2006) (holding that Kentucky’s Judicial Code provision prohibiting 
judges from personally soliciting campaign contributions was a violation of their First 
Amendment rights). 
61 See Family Trust Found. of Ky., Inc. v. Ky. Judicial Conduct Comm’n, 388 F.3d 224, 
227 (6th Cir. 2004) (upholding the district court’s determination that the only difference 
between a judicial code’s “announce clause” and its “promises and commit” clause was one 
of labeling). 
62 Chief Justices Thomas Moyer of Ohio, Randall Shepard of Indiana, and Shirley 
Abrahamson of Wisconsin, and Justices Paul J. De Muniz and Hans A. Linde of Oregon 
have all strongly advocated for judicial selection reform in their states.  See Shirley S. 
Abrahamson, Thorny Issues and Slippery Slopes: Perspectives on Judicial Independence, 
64 OHIO ST. L.J. 3 (2003); Paul J. DeMuniz, Judicial Selection in Oregon: Money, Politics, 
and the Initiative Process, 39 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1265 (2003); Hans A. Linde, Elective 
Judges: Some Comparative Comments, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1995 (1988); Thomas J. Moyer, 
Commission on the 21st Century Judiciary, 38 AKRON L. REV. 555 (2005); Shepard, supra 
note 27. 
63 See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Preserving an Independent Judiciary: The Need for 
Contribution and Expenditure Limits in Judicial Elections, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 133 
(1998); Charles Gardner Geyh, Why Judicial Elections Stink, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 43 (2003); 
Roy Schotland, To the Endangered Species List, Add: Nonpartisan Judicial Elections, 39 
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1397 (2003).  
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citizens’ groups64 are working either to do away with judicial elections completely or 
to regulate them in a way that protects free speech and also judicial independence 
and impartiality. 
B.  Ohio Supreme Court Elections, 1994-2008 
Recent elections to the Ohio Supreme Court have drawn much scholarly 
discussion.65  Most of the scholarly literature has been concerned with two perceived 
problems: large contributions from special interests to candidates that share a 
perceived “judicial philosophy,” and ever-expanding free speech rights for 
candidates to use political campaign language to appeal to voters and contributors.  
This section analyzes these trends from the perspective of the Framers’ interest in 
maintaining judicial independence through the separation of powers.   
In recent years, Ohio’s Supreme Court races have been as expensive and partisan 
as any in the Union.  While general elections for judges are technically non-partisan 
(no party name is listed on the ballot), in order to run in the general election, judicial 
candidates must first win a partisan primary.  Commentators have noted that Ohio’s 
system is the worst of two worlds—already under-informed voters have nothing to 
go by (such as party affiliation on the ballot), while those who closely follow the 
court may infer from the partisan primaries which candidates merit their 
contributions.66  The vast majority of contributions to Ohio Supreme Court 
candidates over the past decade have come from special interest groups such as the 
medical and insurance communities, labor unions, large corporations, and 
attorneys.67  Labor unions and plaintiffs’ firms have given almost exclusively to 
candidates emerging from the Democratic primaries, and business interests and 
corporate law firms have given to the “Republican” candidates.68   
On October 1, 2006, the New York Times published a cover story that 
investigated how Ohio Supreme Court justices voted on non-unanimous cases 
involving large contributors.69  It found that, as a group, the justices voted in their 
contributors’ favor seventy percent of the time, while Justice Terrence O’Donnell 
                                                                 
64 Three of the most active citizens’ groups seeking judicial reform are American 
Judicature Society, http://www.ajs.org/ (last visited Oct. 15, 2009); Justice at Stake, 
http://www.justiceatstake.org/ (last visited Oct. 15, 2009); and Ohio Citizen Action, 
http://www.ohiocitizen.org/ (last visited Oct. 15, 2009). 
65 See Carrington & Long, supra note 44, at 455-57; David Goldberger, The Power of 
Special Interest Groups to Overwhelm Judicial Election Campaigns: The Troublesome 
Interaction Between the Code of Judicial Conduct, Campaign Finance Laws, and the First 
Amendment, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 1 (2003); Nancy Marion, Rick Farmer & Todd Moore, 
Financing Ohio Supreme Court Elections 1992-2002: Campaign Finance and Judicial 
Selection, 38 AKRON L. REV. 567 (2005); Michael E. Solimine, The False Promise of 
Judicial Elections in Ohio, 30 CAP. U.L. REV. 559 (2002). 
66 Barnhizer, supra note 13, at 376 n.49 (citing Alexander Wohl, Justice for Rent: The 
Scandal of Judicial Campaign Financing, AM. PROSPECT, May 22, 2000, at 34). 
67 See Turcer & Danklefsen, supra note 12.  
68 Id. 
69 Liptak & Roberts, supra note 1. 
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sided with his contributors ninety-one percent of the time.70  The article told the 
story of Duane J. Adams, whose Chrysler minivan broke down so many times that he 
filed a “lemon law” case in 2000.71  Between 2000 and 2004 when the case was 
decided, the automotive companies that he was suing (and their representatives) gave 
over $115,000 to the four Ohio Supreme Court justices who would eventually rule 
against him.72  Desperate to keep up, Adams’ attorneys contributed $12,000 to five 
of the justices while the case was ongoing.73  Reflecting on his loss in the lawsuit, 
Adams stated that his adversaries “‘should be prosecuted for what I consider is 
taking a bribe.’”74  Such a comment may give pause to many who are concerned 
about elevating the public’s image of the judiciary.                  
                                                                
Campaign finance statistics show that attorneys and law firms are far more 
partisan in their contributions to judicial candidates than they are to those in real 
political races.  One large Columbus-based law firm gave over $250,000 to Ohio 
Republican candidates for political office (that is, the executive and legislative 
branches) in 2005-2006, but it also gave $200,000 to Democratic candidates.75  In 
contrast, the same firm gave an average of $15,144 to each Republican judicial 
candidate but only an average of $6,333 to each Democratic candidate in the past 
two election cycles.76  Perhaps the law firm sensed that it could realize greater gains 
from its contributions in the judicial races.   
Special interest judicial campaign contributions go both ways.  By far, the largest 
per capita donors are plaintiffs’ personal injury firms, which contribute almost 
exclusively to Democratic candidates.77  In the 2004 Supreme Court election, nine of 
the thirteen firms that contributed more than $30,000 to judicial candidates were 
plaintiffs’ firms, even though they were outnumbered by the four corporate firms at a 
rate of thirty-lawyers-to-one.78  When aggregating these nine personal injury firms 
 
70 Id. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. 
74 Id.  
75 Jim Siegel, Lawyers Hired to Fight First Strickland Veto; GOP Legislators Authorize 
Up to $150,000, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Feb. 1, 2007, at B3. 
76 CATHERINE TURCER & BRANDI WHETSTONE, OHIO CITIZEN ACTION EDUC. FUND, 
ELECTION 2004: CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS TO CANDIDATES FOR CHIEF JUSTICE AND JUSTICE 
OF THE OHIO SUPREME COURT FROM NOVEMBER 2, 2003–OCTOBER 13, 2004 (2004), 
http://www.ohiocitizen.org/moneypolitics/2004/2004pregeneralfinal.doc.  Ohio Supreme 
Court candidate Judge William O’Neill was not factored in, as he accepted no money from 
any source during his campaign.  Not surprisingly, he lost to Justice Terrence O’Donnell for 
the second time in a row. 
77 Id. 
78 Id.  The following table of the nine plaintiffs’ firms and four corporate firms that 
contributed over $30,000 in 2004’s Ohio Supreme Court races is calculated based on 
numbers of Ohio-based attorneys from the Martindale-Hubbell directory 
(www.martindale.com) and firms’ websites. 
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together, a total of ninety lawyers (and their families) contributed a total of 
$346,489.79  No individual or interest group would give so much without believing 
that the money carried serious influence—either on an election’s outcome or on a 
judge once seated.   
In contrast to previous election cycles, 2008 was a quieter year for Ohio Supreme 
Court elections.  Two justices were up for reelection—Republicans Evelyn Lundberg 
Stratton and Maureen O’Connor.80  Their opponents, respectively, were Democrats 
Peter Sikora and Joseph Russo.  Both were state court judges from Cleveland 
without state-wide name recognition.  More importantly, they were at a combined 
six-to-one disadvantage in fundraising.81  Incumbents have won every Ohio Supreme 
Court race since 1986.  Both lost by two-to-one margins in a year where Democrats 
                                                          
Plaintiffs’ Firms / # of Ohio-Based 
Attorneys 
Corporate Firms / # of Ohio-Based 
Attorneys 
  
Nurenberg, Paris, Heller &         
McCarthy / 13 
Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease / 315 
Murray & Murray / 16 Porter, Wright, Morris & Arthur / 318  
Weisman, Kennedy & Berris / 7 Squire, Sanders & Dempsey / 270 
Waite, Schneider, Bayless & Chesley / 17 Jones Day / 325 
Spangenberg, Shibley & Liber / 10  
Williams, Jilek, Lafferty, Gallagher & 
Scott / 9 
 
Allen Schulman & Associates / 3  
Okey Law Firm / 6  
Clark, Perdue, Roberts & Scott / 9  
  
Mean Number of Ohio-Based Attorneys 
= 10 
Mean Number of Ohio-Based Attorneys 
= 307 
 
* Another Plaintiffs’ firm, Burke & McGrath, was excluded from the data because a 
family member gave a (legal) contribution of $50,000 to Democrat Nancy Fuerst’s 
campaign. 
79 Amounts contributed are as calculated from page fourteen of the report available.  See 
TURCER & WHETSONE, supra note 76, at 14. 
80 James Nash, Ohio Judicial Campaigns: 2 High-Court Races Uphill for Dems; 
Outspent Candidates Sikora and Russo Struggle for Recognition on Ballot Without Party 
Labels, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Nov. 2, 2008, at B3. 
81 Id. (“As of Oct. 15, Sikora and Russo had raised a combined $378,286, while 
Stratton, O’Connor and a business-backed group that supports them, the Partnership for 
Ohio’s Future, had raised more than $2.4 million.”). 
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dominated other parts of the ticket.  The Ohio Supreme Court will remain an all-
Republican enclave until the next election cycle.82 
III.  CONSTITUTIONAL VALUES IN CONFLICT 
A.  Courts’ Recognition of the Unique Role of Judges Under the Doctrine of 
Separation of Powers 
Courts often tout the importance of judicial independence, hearkening back to the 
Framers’ understanding of the separation of powers.83  Alexander Hamilton wrote 
that removal from office “is the only provision . . . which is consistent with the 
necessary independence of the judicial character, and is the only one which we find 
in our own constitution in respect to our own judges.”84  Although he was writing in 
respect to the federal judiciary, the Framers expected state courts to, at least broadly, 
reflect their conception of checks and balances under the separation of powers.85  
Modern courts have attempted to reconcile the classic conception of judges as 
independent with this era’s desire for judicial accountability.  In League, the Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeals turned the Framers’ understanding of judicial independence 
on its head.  In that case, the court held that Texas’ system of electing judges 
“advances the effectiveness of its courts by balancing the virtues of accountability 
with the need for independence.  The state attempts to maintain the fact and 
appearance of judicial fairness . . . by insuring that judges remain accountable to the 
range of people within their jurisdiction.”86  The court went on to argue that judicial 
independence was actually strengthened by taking judicial appointments out of the 
hands of local politicians, and giving that power to the people via elections.87  This 
leads to a classic “out of the frying pan, into the fire” scenario.  Any independence 
judges gain by being less beholden to the political branches is likely to be lost when 
                                                                 
82 GOP Keeps Lock on High Court; Victories by O’Connor and Stratton Mean Seven-
Member Court Stays Republican, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, Nov. 5, 2008, at AA12. 
83 See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Clements, 999 F.2d 831 (5th Cir. 1993) 
(arguing that judicial independence from the other branches is maintained by judicial 
elections); United States v. Mendoza, No. CR 03-730 DT, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1449 
(C.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2004) (determining that a legislative act’s mandatory sentencing 
provision violated judicial discretion under the separation of powers); Hastings v. Judicial 
Conference of the U.S., 593 F. Supp. 1371 (D.D.C. 1984) (discussing the power of the 
federal legislature to censure federal judges under the separation of powers); Winter v. 
Coor, 695 P.2d 1094 (Ariz. 1985) (removing local elected magistrate judges at will found to 
be harmful to judicial independence); In re Inquiry Concerning a Judge, 976 P.2d 581 (Utah 
1999) (discussing the separation of powers provision in Utah’s Constitution). 
84 THE FEDERALIST No. 79, supra note 37, at 301. 
85 See DeRolph v. Ohio, 754 N.E.2d 1184, 1202 (Ohio 2001) (Douglas, J., concurring) 
(“‘Separation of powers’ is a misnomer.  There is no explicit declaration concerning 
separation of powers in either the federal Constitution or our state Constitution.  Both 
Constitutions separate government into three branches while fusing certain functions and 
powers of those bodies.”), vacated, 780 N.E.2d 529 (Ohio 2002). 
86 League, 999 F.2d. at 869. 
87 Id.  
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they insert themselves into the political process and are forced to campaign for the 
allegiance of blocs of voters. 
There is little caselaw supporting the notion that judicial elections should reflect 
the fundamental differences between judges and members of the political branches of 
government.88  The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals refused an invitation to do just 
that in the 1998 case of Suster v. Marshall.  In that case, Ronald Suster, a candidate 
for a trial court judgeship in Cleveland, challenged the constitutionality of Ohio’s 
Code of Judicial Conduct Canon VII(C)(6)(d), which limited campaign expenditures 
at that level to $75,000.89  The court struck down any limits on campaign 
expenditures as violative of political free speech.90  Relying on the landmark 
campaign finance case of Buckley v. Valeo, the Sixth Circuit reasoned that limiting 
candidates’ use of their own money was not narrowly tailored to any compelling 
state interest in judicial independence.91  Indeed, “the very fact that the candidate is 
allowed to spend his or her own money without any restriction is . . . the assurance 
that the candidate is ‘beholden to no one.’”92  The Sixth Circuit followed the holding 
of the United States Supreme Court in Federal Election Commission v. National 
Conservative Political Action Committee,93 setting the bar of what would trigger 
strict scrutiny: “[T]he only interest compelling enough to infringe upon the First 
Amendment rights of a candidate seeking an electoral office is the prevention of 
corruption or the appearance of corruption.”94  Note the different standard than that 
which would require a judge’s recusal under the Model Code: “A judge shall 
disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality 
might reasonably be questioned.”95  To date, no Supreme Court majority has held 
that fundamental differences between judges and members of the political branches 
create a compelling interest to “check” the free speech of judicial candidates.    
                                                                 
88 See, e.g., O’Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 530 (1933) (“This separation 
[of powers] is not merely a matter of convenience or of governmental mechanism.  Its 
object is basic and vital, namely, to preclude a commingling of these essentially different 
powers of government in the same hands.” (citation omitted)). 
89 Suster v. Marshall, 149 F.3d 523, 525 (6th Cir. 1998). 
90 Id. at 530.  In Suster, the court maintained that 
[T]he language of Buckley [has] necessarily determined, irrespective of the kind of 
position sought, that any spending restriction in any electoral campaign process is 
an infringement on a candidate’s First Amendment rights, and is subject to “exacting 
scrutiny.”  The guarantees of the First Amendment are not shaped and reshaped 
simply because a litigant wishes to distinguish one type of election from another. 
Neither the First Amendment, nor Buckley can be read so narrowly.   
Id. (citation omitted). 
91 Id. at 532. 
92 Id. 
93 Fed. Election Comm’n v. Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480 
(1985). 
94 Suster, 149 F.3d at 532. 
95 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2.11(A) (2007). 
14https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol57/iss4/7
2009] ALIGNING JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 877 
Justice Stevens’ and Justice Ginsburg’s dissents in Republican Party of 
Minnesota v. White contain the most extensive discussion of how the Framers’ 
doctrine of separation of powers figures into judicial elections.  In that case, the 
majority held that judicial campaigners enjoy the same free speech rights as other 
political candidates.96  Both dissenters rejected that approach, in part, because they 
were concerned that such political speech would destroy the independence of the 
judiciary.  Justice Stevens contended that judges “occupy an office of trust that is 
fundamentally different from that occupied by policymaking officials.  Although 
[many] stand for election . . . , that fact does not lessen their duty to respect essential 
attributes of the judicial office that have been embedded in Anglo-American law for 
centuries.”97  He argued that when judicial candidates announce their views on issues 
that are likely to come before the court, they make it nearly impossible to display the 
most essential of judicial attributes: impartiality.98  Thus, he wrote that Minnesota’s 
“announce clause” should survive strict scrutiny, as it was necessary to protect 
against potential bias toward future litigants.99   
In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg also argued that the “announce clause” did not 
violate the First Amendment due to the fundamental differences between the role of 
judges and other political candidates.100  The core of her argument is cast in 
separation of powers terms: 
The Framers . . . sought to advance the judicial function through the 
structural protections of Article III [of the U.S. Constitution], which 
provide for the selection of judges by the President on the advice and 
consent of the Senate . . . .  Minnesota . . . has decided to allow its citizens 
to choose judges directly in periodic elections[,] but . . . has not thereby 
opted to install a corps of political actors on the bench; rather, it has 
endeavored to preserve the integrity of its judiciary by other means.101 
The means Minnesota chose to differentiate between judicial and political elections 
was to make the former non-partisan and to place some limits on judicial candidates’ 
speech.  She would instead continue what had been done for nearly a century: 
“[D]ifferentiate elections for political offices, in which the First Amendment holds 
full sway, from elections designed to select those whose office it is to administer 
justice without respect to persons.”102  Justice Ginsburg argued that these safeguards 
helped preserve judicial independence and impartiality and, thus, should survive 
strict scrutiny.103  Rather than broadly restricting candidates’ ability to “announce” 
                                                                 
96 Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 788 (2002). 
97 Id. at 797 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
98 Id. at 797-803. 
99 Id. at 801. 
100 Id. at 803-21 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
101 Id. at 804. 
102 Id. at 805. 
103 Id. at 805-08. 
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their views on all politically-charged issues, Minnesota’s announce clause restricted 
candidates from doing so only on issues likely to come before them as judges.104      
B.  When Does a Judge’s “Personal Interest” in a Case Affect Due Process Rights? 
It is impossible to determine a judge’s bias or impartiality in the abstract.  
Potential bias toward a litigant or her cause may only manifest itself in actual cases 
or controversies.105  In two cases, Tumey v. Ohio106 and Ward v. Village of 
Monroeville,107 the United States Supreme Court provided the modern standard by 
which a judge may be deemed impermissibly biased toward a litigant.  The judge in 
Tumey was also the town’s mayor, and he was compensated out of revenues brought 
in by the fines he levied.108  The Court held that it violated a litigant’s due process 
rights to “subject his liberty or property to [a judge that] has a direct, personal, 
substantial pecuniary interest in reaching a conclusion against him in his case.”109   
In Ward, the judge (who was also the mayor) was not paid from the fines he 
levied; he controlled the village’s finances, which consisted largely of such fines.110  
The United States Supreme Court still held that the mayor’s impartiality could be 
seen as compromised.111  A defendant’s due process rights were violated if the 
“situation is one ‘which would offer a possible temptation to the average man as a 
judge to forget the burden of proof required . . . or which might lead him not to hold 
the balance nice, clear, and true between the state and the accused . . . .’”112  In 
expanding Tumey’s definition of what a “direct” interest in the outcome of a case 
might look like, Ward also expanded litigants’ due process rights to cases where a 
judge may even appear to have a personal interest in the outcome. 
After Ward, claimants first tried to apply Ward’s expansive view of due process 
rights to administrative agency proceedings.  In Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., the Court 
declined to extend Ward to parties appearing before officials whose roles more 
closely resembled prosecutors than judges.113  Still, the Court emphasized that 
litigants may expect judges to “preserve[] both the appearance and reality of fairness, 
‘ . . . so important to a popular government, that justice has been done,’ by ensuring 
that . . . the arbiter is not predisposed to find against him.”114  In Aetna Life 
                                                                 
104 Id. at 810-11. 
105 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
106 Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927). 
107 Ward v. Vill. of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972). 
108 Tumey, 273 U.S. at 515, 521-22. 
109 Id. at 523 (emphasis added). 
110 Ward, 409 U.S. at 58. 
111 Id. at 60. 
112 Id. (quoting Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927)) (alteration in original).   
113 Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238 (1980); see also Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 
35 (1975) (holding that it did not violate due process for an administrative board to fulfill 
both investigative and adjudicative roles). 
114 Marshall, 446 U.S. at 242 (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 
123, 172 (1951)) (citation omitted). 
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Insurance Co. v. LaVoie, the Court held that an Alabama Supreme Court justice 
should not sit on a case involving an insurance company against which he had a 
pending suit.115   Chief Justice Burger held that a judge cannot be “‘permitted to try 
cases where he has an interest in the outcome.’”116  While the Court refused to draw 
a bright line as to where disqualification would be required, it further expanded 
Tumey and Ward by stating that litigants’ due process rights “‘may sometimes bar 
trial by judges who have no actual bias and who would do their very best to weigh 
the scales of justice equally between contending parties.  But to perform its high 
functions in the best way, “justice must satisfy the appearance of justice.”’”117  In 
LaVoie, the Court proclaimed that a litigant’s due process rights may be violated by 
even an appearance of judicial bias.118 
                                                                
These cases were those that the majority opinion primarily cited in the recent 
landmark case of Caperton v. Massey Coal Co.119  Much has been, and will be, 
written about this case in the months and years to come.  For our purposes, however, 
only a brief outline is needed.  The facts of Caperton read like a pulpy John Grisham 
novel.120  Don Blankenship, owner of Massey Energy, lost a fifty million dollar jury 
verdict in favor of Hugh Caperton and his small coal company.121  While the case 
was about to be appealed to the West Virginia Supreme Court, Blankenship created a 
Political Action Committee called “And for the Sake of the Kids” to funnel over 
three million dollars to his chosen candidate, Brent Benjamin.122  This was over one 
million dollars more than the total amount of money spent by both sides and more 
than triple that of Benjamin’s own campaign committee.123  Benjamin won the race 
against the incumbent.  When the case came before the state’s highest court, 
Benjamin denied Caperton’s motion to recuse, arguing that no objective evidence 
existed to suggest that he was actually biased in Massey’s (or Blankenship’s) 
favor.124  Eventually, Benjamin cast the deciding vote in the three-to-two decision to 
overturn the fifty million dollar verdict.125 
Caperton sought relief before the United States Supreme Court on due process 
grounds.  The Court accepted the case, and a five-justice majority held in his favor.  
In his majority opinion, Justice Anthony Kennedy was careful to limit the Court’s 
 
115 Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813 (1986). 
116 Id. at 833 (quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)). 
117 Id. at 825 (citing In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)). 
118  Id.  
119 Caperton v. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009). 
120 Caperton is, in fact, the basis of a John Grisham novel.  See JOHN GRISHAM, THE 
APPEAL (Bantam Dell, 2008) (2008); see also Jess Bravin, Justices Set New Standard for 
Recusals, WALL ST. J., June 9, 2009, at A3. 
121 Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2257. 
122 Id.  
123 Id. 
124 Id. at 2258. 
125 Id. at 2257-58. 
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holding to extreme cases such as this.126  Justice Kennedy held that under the 
circumstances, the probability of bias was so great that the Due Process Clause must 
be invoked.  Analyzing the case in light of the well established due process 
jurisprudence of Tumey, Ward, and Lavoie,127 the majority held that “Blankenship’s 
significant and disproportionate influence—coupled with the temporal relationship 
between the election and the pending case—‘offer a possible temptation to the 
average . . . judge to . . . lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear and true.’”128 
The Caperton decision is surely a victory for those who fear the corrupting 
influence of money in judicial campaigns.  Its significance should not be overstated, 
however.  First, its facts are almost comically extreme.  Second, the majority holding 
is reasonably limited to similar cases.  And third, Justice Kennedy clearly notes that 
the Due Process Clause of the Constitution is something of a last resort—providing 
minimal protection for the most extreme breaches of justice.129  Justice Kennedy 
reminds us that state legislatures and Bar Associations are free to regulate such 
activities more strictly within the boundaries of the Constitution.  As discussed 
below, one such boundary that has yet to be clearly established is that of judicial 
candidates’ free-speech rights.  It remains to be seen how these rights will be 
reconciled with other fundamental constitutional values such as the separation of 
powers and litigants’ due process rights. 
C.  Judicial Candidates’ Expanding Right to Campaign Free Speech 
While litigants have the right to a judge who neither is nor appears to be partial, 
judicial candidates are now freer than ever to disclose their views on issues they may 
face on the bench.130  In Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, Justice Scalia’s 
majority opinion found Minnesota’s judicial ethics code restriction on candidates’ 
right to “announce” their views on issues that may come before the court to be 
unconstitutional.131  Justice Scalia applied the classic strict scrutiny test, holding that 
the clause was not narrowly tailored to meet the compelling state interest in 
protecting political speech.132  The defendants argued that the state had a compelling 
interest in both impartiality and the appearance of impartiality in the state 
judiciary.133  In the course of his opinion, Justice Scalia addressed three meanings of 
the word “impartiality”: (1) lack of bias toward a party to a proceeding; (2) lack of 
                                                                 
126 Id. at 2263-65.  “On these extreme facts the probability of actual bias rises to an 
unconstitutional level.”  Id. at 2265. 
127 See supra notes 107-16 and accompanying text. 
128 Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2265 (quoting Atena Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 
825 (1986)) (alteration in original).  
129 Id. at 2265-66. 
130 See generally Nat Stern, The Looming Collapse of Restrictions on Judicial 
Campaign Speech, 38 SETON HALL L. REV. 63 (2008) (envisioning a post-White future of 
unrestrained judicial campaign speech). 
131 Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 788 (2002). 
132 Id. at 776. 
133 Id. at 775. 
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preconceptions toward particular legal views; and (3) “openmindedness.”134  He 
concluded that the provision was underinclusive because it only prohibited such 
statements on the campaign trail—precisely when political speech is most 
protected.135  Second, he argued that there was no interest, compelling or otherwise, 
in judges to be without well-formed opinions on the law.136  Finally, he argued that 
the defendants had not shown “that campaign statements are uniquely destructive of 
openmindedness.”137  According to Justice Scalia, the “announce” clause failed to 
protect judges’ free speech rights in its effort to protect judges’ appearance and 
reality of impartiality.138 
Justice O’Connor joined the majority, but in a strongly-worded concurrence 
called into question whether state judicial elections have any value.139  She argued 
that judicial impartiality is very difficult to maintain when judges’ decisions impact, 
and are impacted by, voters and contributors.140  She wrote that Minnesota’s “claim 
that it needs to significantly restrict judges’ speech in order to protect judicial 
impartiality is particularly troubling.  If the State has a problem with judicial 
impartiality, it is largely one the State brought upon itself by continuing the practice 
of popularly electing judges.”141  In his concurrence, Justice Kennedy agreed with 
the majority that the judicial code’s provision was poorly tailored to achieve its 
stated purpose, but he reiterated that states do have a compelling interest in impartial 
judiciaries.  He acknowledged that “[states] may adopt recusal standards more 
rigorous than due process requires, and censure judges who violate these 
standards.”142 
D.  Buckley, McConnell, and the Less-Protected Speech of Campaign Contributions 
First Amendment free speech and Fourteenth Amendment due process rights 
inevitably come into conflict in determining how states may regulate judicial 
campaigns within the bounds of the Constitution.143  The landmark campaign-finance 
case Buckley v. Valeo held that two unequal free speech interests are at play when 
analyzing campaign speech.144  The Court distinguished the highest level of 
                                                                 
134 Id. at 775-79. 
135 Id. at 776. 
136 Id. at 777. 
137 Id. at 781. 
138 Id. at 776. 
139 Id. at 788-92 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
140 Id. at 789-90. 
141 Id. at 792. 
142 Id. at 794 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
143 See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992) (holding under strict scrutiny that 
political speech may be limited in order to accommodate the right to vote, another 
fundamental right); City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 76 (1980) (“[A] law that impinges 
upon a fundamental right explicitly or implicitly secured by the Constitution is presumptively 
unconstitutional.”). 
144 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).  
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protection afforded candidates’ “political” speech rights from the less-protected right 
of campaign contributors to “electioneering” speech.145  The Court maintained that 
political expression is “‘at the core of our electoral process and of the First 
Amendment freedoms.’”146  The Court then contrasted the less-robust rights of 
campaign contributors and reasoned that such rights may be curtailed “to limit the 
actuality and appearance of corruption resulting from large individual financial 
contributions.”147  Thus, the Court upheld laws limiting contributions while striking 
down provisions limiting expenditures as not being narrowly tailored to meet this 
compelling interest.148   
In the 2003 case of McConnell v. Federal Election Commission,149 the United 
States Supreme Court expanded on Buckley’s core holding.  It upheld most of the 
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002,150 which sought to close loopholes in 
“soft money”—money given to political parties by corporations and unions to 
circumvent restrictions on direct contributions.151  It followed Buckley in holding that 
contribution limits to candidates, Political Action Committees,152 or political parties 
are constitutional and are not subject to strict scrutiny.153  The Court confirmed the 
vital “interests that underlie contribution limits—interests in preventing ‘both the 
actual corruption threatened by large financial contributions and the eroding of 
public confidence in the electoral process through the appearance of corruption’”154 
and that such “interests directly implicate ‘“the integrity of our electoral 
process.”’”155   
After McConnell, it is clear that ordinary political campaigns may be regulated to 
protect against corruption.  Why has the Court refused to provide more strict due 
process safeguards in the conduct of judicial campaigns?  Commenting on due 
process, Justice Powell has stated that it “‘is not a technical conception with a fixed 
                                                                 
145 Id. at 19-21. 
146 Id. at 39 (quoting Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 32 (1968)). 
147 Id. at 26. 
148 Id. at 52-53. 
149 McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003). 
150 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 
(codified in part at 2 U.S.C. § 431 (2006)). 
151 McConnell, 540 U.S. at 141; see generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 1079-82 (3d ed. 2006). 
152 See also Cal. Med. Ass’n v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 453 U.S. 182, 193-94 (1981) 
(holding that the principles of Buckley may be expanded to allow legislatures to limit 
contributions to Political Action Committees). 
153 McConnell, 540 U.S. at 141. 
154 Id. at 136 (quoting Fed. Election Comm’n v. Nat’l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 
197, 208 (1982)). 
155 Id. at 136 (quoting Fed. Election Comm’n v. Nat’l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 
197, 208 (1982) (quoting United States v. Int’l Union United Auto., Aircraft & Agric. 
Implement Workers of Am., 352 U.S. 567, 570 (1957))). 
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content unrelated to time, place and circumstances.’”156  “‘[D]ue process is flexible 
and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.’”157  
The “situation” of apparent judicial bias has never been so obvious as it is in the 
current climate.  White shows a Supreme Court unwilling to curtail political speech; 
thus, judicial candidates are free to announce their legal and political biases with 
impunity.  Only four current Supreme Court Justices are known to recognize great 
differences between judicial races and legislative or executive races.158  In their 
dissents in White, Justices Stevens and Ginsburg (each joined by Justices Souter and 
Breyer) both argued that political speech during a judicial race may be limited 
because judges are fundamentally different under the Constitutional doctrine of 
separation of powers.  Justice Stevens acknowledged the “critical difference between 
the work of the judge and the work of other public officials.”159  Justice Ginsburg 
argued that the speech sanctioned by the majority compromises litigants’ due process 
right to an impartial tribunal.160  It is true that campaign contributions may be 
limited, but the greater issue is whether states have a compelling interest in doing so 
to protect litigants’ constitutional rights. 
IV.  RECLAIMING THE APPEARANCE AND REALITY OF JUDICIAL IMPARTIALITY 
A.  Judges Often Allow Political Considerations to Affect their Neutrality 
Umpires are the trial court judges of the baseball diamond.  Now imagine if 
umpires were elected and forced to fundraise.  Like lawyers, Major League Baseball 
players would have a vested interest to contribute money to the campaigns.  Now, let 
us say your favorite player came to bat and was called out on a questionable third 
strike.  How much confidence would you have in that call if you knew, or later 
discovered, that the pitcher gave $10,000 to that particular umpire’s election 
campaign?161 
Under the present standards of judicial ethics, almost no elected judges are 
censured for the appearance of partiality, absent blatant corruption.162  This is true, 
                                                                 
156 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976) (quoting Cafeteria Workers v. 
McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961)). 
157 Id. (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)) (alteration in original). 
158 See Suster v. Marshall, 149 F.3d 523, 523-35 (6th Cir. 1998) (relying on Buckley and 
finding Ohio’s limit on expenditures in judicial campaigns to be unconstitutional). 
159 Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 798 (2002) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). 
160 Id. at 814-17 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).   
161 James Andrew Wynn, Jr., Judging the Judges, 86 MARQ. L. REV. 753, 760 (2003). 
162 Barnhizer, supra note 13, at 366.  Barnhizer minces no words:   
The corruption of the judiciary includes deliberate judicial wrongdoing in 
exchange for financial contributions. But it also involves more subtle judicial 
behavior shaped to fit contributors’ agendas.  The belief that judges are directly or 
indirectly trading rulings for contributions has significant potential for developing 
among citizens a widespread perception of corrupt judicial fundraising and related 
favor-selling. Even if judicial corruption through decisions that favor special 
interests is not empirically demonstrable, the public’s perception will be that judicial 
21Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2009
884 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57:863 
even though the system has remarkable similarities to the baseball analogy above.  In 
order to get elected, many state supreme court judges need to raise millions of 
dollars.  To raise that much money, judges must become politicians and run political 
campaigns.  The broad free speech protections granted by White came at a 
convenient time, for they enable judicial candidates to send targeted messages to 
special interests letting them know that the judicial candidate may be counted on.163 
Special interest groups are unlikely to gamble with unknown commodities, giving 
candidates further incentives to announce, pledge, or promise their intended behavior 
from the bench.   
Interest groups’ contributions create this dilemma: do they give large 
contributions to specific candidates because they appear to share “judicial 
philosophies,” or do they do it to secure their vote in future disputes?  The result is 
the same under either scenario.  When forced to act like a politician, a judicial 
candidate becomes just that, representing (even cultivating) constituents from the 
bench.  In the baseball analogy, the pitcher who gives the umpire $10,000 does it 
with a clear objective—to gain an advantage.  If he does not get the “return” he 
expects from the first umpire, the next time his dollars will go to another one.  
Hence, the first umpire knows what he has to do to keep the money coming.  State 
supreme court elections require a tremendous amount of money, which force judicial 
candidates to cultivate constituencies to keep their jobs.  Through a combination of 
bias-creating (but protected) speech and bias-ensuring (but legal) campaign money, 
litigants on the wrong side of a state supreme court majority often do not stand a 
chance.   
Jonathan L. Entin argues that so much money and thought have been put into 
recent Ohio Supreme Court races because the court has tremendous influence over 
politically-charged topics such as tort reform and school funding.164  He states that 
Ohio’s contentious judicial elections result “less from the state’s method of choosing 
judges than from a political culture that places substantial weight on judicial 
philosophy and case outcomes.”165  This may be true, but it does nothing to solve the 
problem of citizens’ lack of confidence in the judiciary.  By giving large 
contributions, special interests seek to elect the candidate that they believe will best 
represent their interests.166  It is only natural that judges then decide cases according 
                                                          
decision-making favors special interests to which the judge is obligated through 
financial or other campaign support.   
Id. 
163 Id. at 364 (“Judges need to attract the contributions both for their own campaigns 
and to keep the funds . . . away from potential competitors.  Judges do this by crafting 
messages that signal to the contributors that the candidates are willing to provide what the 
donors want in exchange for their money.”). 
164 See Jonathan L. Entin, Judicial Selection and Political Culture, 30 CAP. U. L. REV. 
523 (2002). 
165 Id. at 525. 
166 Symposium, Appointment Versus Election: Balancing Independence and 
Accountability, 33 U. TOL. L. REV. 287 (2002).  One panel member was Steven Hantler, 
DaimlerChrysler’s Assistant General Counsel for litigation strategy and communication.  He 
claimed that large corporate contributions were necessary to ensure a level playing field: 
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to the needs of the next campaign.  Such a climate seems to demand a presumption 
toward those whose disputes are heard by judges who have accepted large 
contributions from the other side.  In abandoning the Framers’ conception of 
separation of powers, we may have lost much of the judicial independence that 
doctrine was instituted to protect.   
B.  Judges Should Have More Strict Recusal Requirements 
Today, judges recuse themselves only if they have had close political167 or 
financial168 dealings with a client or the client’s counsel.  Tumey’s “direct, personal, 
substantial[,] pecuniary interest”169 standard should be expanded to require recusal in 
more situations in which judges’ lack of the appearance of impartiality compromises 
courts’ integrity.  Several commentators have called for recusal when judges have 
been outspoken on issues or persons that they will be required to adjudicate.170  
                                                          
Why is the method by which we place state court judges on the bench such an 
important issue[,] . . . [and] why does the trial bar, the American Bar Association, 
and American business make this such an important issue?   
I think that answer to either question is that we all have so much at stake in 
how the American legal system works.  My comments on this point are, of course, 
from the perspective of American business.  What does American business want 
from the civil side of the legal system?   
We want four things.  We want predictability, fairness, timeliness, and 
efficiency. 
Id. at 299.  He then argued that separation of powers was better maintained by having 
judges elected by the people rather than appointed by government’s other branches.  Id. at 
301.   
167 See Caleffe v. Vitale, 488 So. 2d 627, 628 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (“The judicial 
inquiry should focus on the reasonableness of the affiant’s belief that the judge may be 
biased, and not the judge’s own perception of his or her ability to act fairly.”); Aetna Cas. & 
Sur. Co. v. Berry, 669 So. 2d 56, 74 (Miss. 1996) (holding that “[i]f a reasonable person, 
knowing all the circumstances, would harbor doubts about the judge’s impartiality, he is 
required to recuse himself”; here, one party’s attorney had been “heav[il]y involved” in 
judge’s election campaign).  But see Gluth Bros. Constr. v. Union Nat’l Bank, 548 N.E.2d 
1364 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (holding that a judge need not recuse himself or herself even 
though counsel served as campaign manager six years earlier); Ainsworth v. Combined Ins. 
Co. of Am., 774 P.2d 1003 (Nev. 1989) (holding that a judge need not recuse himself or 
herself even though counsel served as campaign co-chairman). 
168 See Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847 (1988) (affirming the 
lower court’s sanctions against judge who should have known about financial conflict of 
interest in case before him); Chase Manhattan Bank v. Affiliated FM Ins. Co., 343 F.3d 120 
(2d Cir. 2004) (holding that trial judge abused discretion when denying party’s recusal 
motion; judge had considerable stock in bank); Moody v. Simmons, 858 F.2d 137 (3d Cir. 
1988) (determining that judge should have recused himself when daughter was employee of 
company in bankruptcy proceedings and could have benefited financially from favorable 
ruling). 
169 See Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927). 
170 See Katherine A. Moerke, Must More Speech be the Solution to Harmful Speech? 
Judicial Elections After Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 48 S.D. L. REV. 262, 319 
(2003) (commenting favorably on states that, post-White, are strengthening recusal 
requirements in their judicial ethics codes); Thomas R. Phillips & Karlene Dunn Poll, Free 
Speech for Judges and Fair Appeals For Litigants: Judicial Recusal in a Post-White World, 
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Others have called for rules to be implemented requiring recusal when a litigant has 
contributed more than a certain amount to the judge’s campaign.171  Like the baseball 
umpire of the previous section, fans will assess differently an umpire who regularly 
berates Barry Bonds in the press when he makes a controversial call against him.  
One unfair umpire lowers the esteem in which the entire group is held.  In such as 
situation, it would be better for baseball simply to assign such an umpire to other 
teams’ games. 
Currently, judges do not recuse themselves when one party, or their counsel, 
appearing before them has given them a large campaign contribution.172  In 
MacKenzie v. Breakstone,173 the Florida Supreme Court decided that a trial judge 
need not recuse herself from a case in which one party had donated $500 to her 
husband’s election campaign.  The Court held that an allegation that a litigant or 
litigant’s counsel has legally contributed money either to the trial judge or her 
spouse, without some other aggravating detail, was not a sufficient ground to grant a 
motion for recusal.174  In Cicchini v. Blackwell,175 the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals 
refused to grant relief to a plaintiff complaining that his due process rights had been 
violated when Ohio Supreme Court justices refused to recuse themselves.176  The 
plaintiff requested recusal solely on the basis of campaign contributors’ amicus 
curiae briefs, without claiming that this created a “‘direct, personal, substantial’” 
interest in finding in favor of contributors.177     
                                                          
55 DRAKE L. REV. 691 (2007) (calling on the legal community to devise stricter recusal 
standards in the wake of expanding judicial campaign speech); Matthew J. Medina, Note, The 
Constitutionality of the 2003 Revisions to Canon 3(E) of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct, 
104 COLUM. L. REV. 1072, 1096-99 (2004) (arguing that the recusal standard in Texas’ Code 
of Judicial Conduct is likely to survive strict scrutiny in the wake of Republican Party of 
Minnesota v. White).  But see Matthew D. Besser, Note, May I Be Recused? The Tension 
Between Judicial Campaign Speech and Recusal After Republican Party of Minnesota v. 
White, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1197, 1218-25 (2003) (arguing that judges need not recuse themselves 
in cases where they previously gave their opinions while campaigning). 
171 See, e.g., John A. Meiser, Note, The (Non)Problem of a Limited Due Process Right 
to Judicial Disqualification, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1799 (2009) (offering an early 
assessment of the impact of Caperton and arguing that recusal rules are the best we can 
hope for since due process is such a difficult standard to meet). 
172 See, e.g., Shepherdson v. Nigro, No. 97-5504, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6712 (E.D. Pa. 
May 14, 1998) (denying litigants’ claim for damages from a judge who heard his case and 
had received modest campaign contributions from the opposing side); Rocha v. Ahmad, 662 
S.W.2d 77, 78 (Tex. App. 1983) (“If a judge cannot sit on a case in which a contributing 
lawyer is involved as counsel, judges who have been elected would have to recuse 
themselves in [most cases].”).  But see Geary v. Renne, 911 F.2d 280, 292 n.9 (9th Cir. 
1990) (commenting that in a criminal matter, when judges receive large donations from 
fraternal police groups, “[d]efense counsel may well wonder whether their clients will 
receive a fair shake from the recipients of that largesse.”).  
173 MacKenzie v. Breakstone, 565 So. 2d 1332 (Fla. 1990). 
174 Id. at 1338. 
175 Cicchini v. Blackwell, 127 Fed. App’x 187 (6th Cir. 2005). 
176 Id. at 191. 
177 Id. (citation in original). 
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In the post-White climate of unfettered judicial speech, litigants and their 
attorneys are unlikely to be successful in efforts to force judges to recuse themselves 
based on prior statements.  Judicial candidates have been emboldened not only to 
announce their views, but even to make pledges or promises of future conduct on the 
bench.  For example, Ohio Court of Appeals Judge William O’Neill announced 
during his run for the Ohio Supreme Court in 2006 that he was “‘the labor candidate 
in this race,’” and pledged that he expected to side with labor “‘roughly 60 to 70 
percent of the time.’”178  If Wal-Mart were to draw Judge O’Neill for an “employees’ 
right to organize” case, one may conclude that Wal-Mart would be distinctly 
disadvantaged because of Judge O’Neill’s prior statements.  Similarly, if a judge 
boasts in his or her campaign, “If I am elected, convicted murderers will pay the 
price,” one could reasonably believe the judge would have difficulty being impartial 
in assessing mitigating factors during sentencing.   
Yet, there are several recent cases that point to increased judicial sensitivity to 
parties’ claims of judicial bias.  In one case, five Ohio Supreme Court justices 
recused themselves in a case involving Tom Noe, a Republican fundraiser.179  Noe, 
who contributed over $23,000 to the justices, has since been jailed for instigating a 
rare coin investment scandal.180  In the other case, four Ohio justices were either 
targets or beneficiaries of issue advertisements from “Citizens for a Strong Ohio,” a 
political arm of the Ohio Chamber of Commerce.181  The justices recused themselves 
from a case involving the political group explaining that they sought to avoid any 
appearance of conflicts of interest.182 
In another example, the Sixth Circuit recently held in Fieger v. Ferry183 that 
federal courts may consider denials of recusal motions in state courts where judges’ 
prior statements may have made them appear to be biased toward a party.184  The 
parties in this long-time dispute are Geoffrey Fieger, a controversial plaintiffs’ 
lawyer and former Michigan Democratic gubernatorial candidate, and four 
                                                                 
178 See Dennis J. Willard, Candidates in a Rematch for High Court, AKRON BEACON J., 
Oct. 18, 2006, at A1. 
179 See James Drew & Mike Wilkinson, Most Justices Sit out Lawsuits Involving Noe; 
Blackwell Reviews Coin Dealer’s Campaign Donations Since 1990, TOLEDO BLADE, May 
19, 2005, at A1; James Drew & Steve Eder, Task Force Claims Former Taft Aide Funneled 
Noe Cash: Lobbyist Gave to 3 Justices’ Campaigns, TOLEDO BLADE, Jan. 28, 2006, at A1. 
180 Drew & Wilkinson, supra note 179. 
181 See Jim Provance, 4 Justices Recuse Selves; Judges Cite Influence of Chamber’s 
Ads, TOLEDO BLADE, Nov. 9, 2004, at A3. 
182 Id.; see also Jim Provance, Skip FirstEnergy Case, 5 Ohio Justices Urged: Watchdog 
Cites $125,000 in Campaign Gifts, TOLEDO BLADE, Sept. 16, 2005, at A1; Carl Weiser, 
Ohio Court Elections Costly: Report Blasts Secret-Donor System, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, 
May 7, 2004, at B1 (discussing how special interest money and issue advertisements 
affected Ohio’s Supreme Court elections in 2000 and 2002); Daniel Tokaji, Ohio’s 
“Coingate” Scandal: How it Exposes the Flaws of our Campaign Finance System, 
FINDLAW, July 7, 2005, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/commentary/20050707_tokaji.html. 
183 Fieger v. Ferry, 471 F.3d 637 (6th Cir. 2006). 
184 Id. at 646. 
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Republican members of Michigan’s Supreme Court.185  All four justices spoke out 
against Fieger during their judicial campaigns in 2000.186  One stated with 
disapproval that Fieger “‘has $90 million in lawsuit awards pending in the State 
Court of Appeals.’”187   
Since then, Fieger has unsuccessfully sought these justices’ recusal in every case 
in which he has appeared.188  Fieger lost multi-million dollar awards for his clients 
(and himself) in Gilbert v. DaimlerChrysler Corp.189 and Graves v. Warner Bros.190  
In both cases, the four anti-Fieger justices were pivotal in overturning substantial 
jury verdicts.191  This led Fieger to sue the justices in federal court via a Section 1983 
civil rights action, seeking the right to challenge the justices’ refusal to recuse 
themselves.192  The federal district court dismissed Fieger’s claim.193  On appeal, the 
Sixth Circuit held that federal courts are only precluded from deciding matters of 
state law retrospectively.194  Therefore, the appellate court reversed and entered a 
declaratory judgment giving Fieger the right to relief prospectively.195  The Sixth 
Circuit’s decision granting the right to sue and depose these four justices in the 
future is a personal victory for Fieger.196  More importantly, this decision may signal 
                                                                 
185 Molly McDonough, Feisty Fieger Carries On His Fight, A.B.A. J., e-report, Feb. 14, 
2007,  http://www.abanet.org/journal/ereport/j12fieger.html. 
186 Id.  
187 Fieger, 471 F.3d at 643 (citation omitted).  Fieger has been reprimanded regularly 
for name-calling and using vulgar language in reference to the four justices.  See Grievance 
Admin. v. Fieger, 719 N.W.2d 123 (Mich. 2006).  In 1999, he called the four justices 
“Nazis” on a radio program.  Dawson Bell, Justices Say Fieger Spoke Wrongly: Vulgarity 
Wasn’t Allowable, High Court Rules, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Aug. 1, 2006, at 1. 
188 See Adam Liptak, Unfettered Debate Takes Unflattering Turn in Michigan Supreme 
Court, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2007, at A21 (describing Justice Elizabeth A. Weaver’s 
ongoing dispute with four of her conservative colleagues who in her opinion “should have 
disqualified themselves from Mr. Fieger’s case because they had displayed ‘bias and 
prejudice’ in public comments made about him”). 
189 Gilbert v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 685 N.W.2d 391, 394 (Mich. 2004) (finding the 
punitive damages award to be excessive and ordering a new trial). 
190 Graves v. Warner Bros., 656 N.W.2d 195 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002); see also Graves v. 
Warner Bros., 669 N.W.2d 552 (Mich. 2004) (denying Fieger’s motion for recusal of 
Michigan Supreme Court justices). 
191 Of course, Fieger was denied the substantial contingency fees he expected to earn. 
192 See Fieger v. Ferry, 471 F.3d 637 (6th Cir. 2006); see also Allan Falk, Proof of 
Actual Bias is Prerequisite to Judge’s Disqualification, MICH. LAW. WKLY., Jan. 22, 2007 
(claiming that each of the four justices who have spoken out against Fieger has “an 
individual legal philosophy, where each conscientiously considers each case on its own 
terms, . . . without regard to the parties or attorneys involved”).  
193 Fieger v. Ferry, No. 04-60089, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44190, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 
13, 2005).   
194 Fieger, 471 F.3d at 646. 
195 Id.   
196 See McDonough, supra note 185. 
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growing concern within the American legal community that judges that lack the 
appearance of impartiality severely harm the public’s perception of the judiciary.           
Still, there is no dollar amount that a contributor could give, within the legal 
limits, which would compel a judge to recuse himself or herself from a case 
involving that contributor.  Even if the four dissenting justices in White might find a 
compelling interest in the due process rights of a litigant such as the unlucky 
Chrysler minivan owner Duane J. Adams,197 the rest of the Court would be unlikely 
to go along.  This is especially true after the retirement of Justice O’Connor, whose 
concurrence in White expressed strong reservations about judicial elections’ 
continuing validity.198  Thus, the best solution is to expand Buckley and McConnell’s 
campaign finance restrictions to the realm of judicial campaigns.  Having opened the 
door for strict regulation of contributions in political campaigns, further restriction of 
such contributions in judicial campaigns will best preserve litigants’ due process 
rights.   
C.  Public Funding of Judicial Elections 
Most states with elected judiciaries are unlikely to switch to appointive systems 
in the near future.  When such measures are put on ballots, voters usually choose to 
retain their right to elect judges.199  Ohio voters have twice rejected ballot measures 
that would bring the state merit selection of judges.200  States such as Illinois, 
Louisiana, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Texas, West Virginia, Arkansas, and 
Minnesota have also rejected merit selection in the past thirty-five years.201   
At the same time, surveys have shown that the public, and even many judges, 
believe that campaign contributions affect how judges decide cases.  A 2002 “Justice 
at Stake” survey of 2,428 state court judges found that 35% of state supreme court 
justices, and 26% of judges overall, felt that campaign contributions had some 
influence on judges’ decisions.202  In 1999, a survey of 1,826 citizens found that 78% 
agreed with this statement: “‘Elected judges are influenced by having to raise 
campaign funds.’”203  If litigants’ due process rights are compromised by both the 
                                                                 
197 See Liptak & Roberts, supra note 1.   
198 Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 788-92 (2002) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring). 
199 See Lenore L. Prather, Judicial Selection—What is Right for Mississippi?, 21 MISS. 
C. L. REV. 199, 206 (2002).  Of course, the main reason is that when voters are given the 
choice between retaining or giving up a power they currently hold, they will usually choose 
the former.  
200 Lawrence Landskroner, Editorial, An Unmeritorious Way to Select Judges, PLAIN 
DEALER (Cleveland), Jan. 29, 1994, at B7. 
201 Prather, supra note 199. 
202 JUSTICE AT STAKE CAMPAIGN, JUSTICE AT STAKE—STATE JUDGES FREQUENCY 
QUESTIONNAIRE 5 (2001-2002), http://faircourts.org/files/JASJudgesSurveyResults.pdf. 
203 Thomas J. Moyer, supra note 62, at 556 (quoting NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, 
HOW THE PUBLIC VIEWS THE STATE COURTS, A 1999 NATIONAL SURVEY (1999), 
http://www.ncsconline.org/WC/Publications/Res_AmtPTC_PublicViewCrtsPub.pdf.) 
(alteration in original).  
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reality and appearance of judicial partiality, these rights create a compelling state 
interest in protecting them. 
One way states have sought to remedy the ills of judicial elections without doing 
away with them entirely is by instituting public financing plans.204  Although 
promising, public financing has not taken off nationally.  In 1973, Wisconsin became 
the first state to undertake public financing for its supreme court races.205  It achieved 
its funding by placing opt-in provisions on citizens’ tax forms.  After a promising 
initial period, the number of citizens contributing to the fund has dwindled over the 
years.206  Today, public financing in Wisconsin is on its last legs.  By contrast, North 
Carolina’s system of publicly-financed judicial elections is thriving.207  Two main 
factors have contributed to its success since it was instituted in 2002.208  First, the 
change has had genuine grassroots support.  Like Wisconsin, North Carolina relies 
on voluntary check-offs on state tax forms, as well as a voluntary additional yearly 
fee for the state’s lawyers.209 Because much of the money raised has gone to 
education and voter guides, citizens are more educated about, and thus supportive of, 
the initiative.210  Second, in order to be eligible for public funds, candidates must get 
small contributions from at least three hundred and fifty contributors, ensuring that 
the candidates have some popular support.211    
In order for public financing of judicial elections in Ohio to work over the long 
term, it must avoid several pitfalls.  The first, lack of adequate funding, has harmed 
Wisconsin and may do the same in North Carolina after the first wave of citizen 
enthusiasm wears off.  This can be avoided by funding judicial campaigns via a 
small surcharge on the initial filing fee for complaints filed in state court.212  Second, 
public funding of judicial elections must be accompanied by vigorous civic 
education.  This may include television advertisements, voter guides, or other 
                                                                 
204 See Charles Gardner Geyh, Publicly Financed Judicial Elections: An Overview, 34 
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1467 (2001) (offering a sober-minded but positive assessment of ways to 
bring about full public financing); Deborah Goldberg, Public Funding of Judicial Elections: 
The Roles of Judges and the Rules of Campaign Finance, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 95 (2003). 
205 See Geyh, supra note 204, at 1476-78 (detailing Wisconsin’s public-financing 
experiment). 
206 Id. at 1477. 
207 See Am. Judicature Society, Judicial Selection in the States: North Carolina, 
http://web.archive.org/web/20071011054407/http://www.ajs.org/js/NC.htm (last visited 
Oct. 12, 2009) (listing grassroots groups working to ensure the success of North Carolina’s 
system of full public financing). 
208 See Doug Bend, Note, North Carolina’s Public Financing of Judicial Campaigns: A 
Preliminary Analysis, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 597 (2005). 
209 Id. at 601-02. 
210 Id. at 602. 
211 Legislative Summary of Senate Bill 1054—N.C. Judicial Campaign Reform Act, 
http://www.ncvotered.com/downloads/j_reform_act/leg_summary.doc (on file with author). 
212 Judge William M. O’Neill, Ohio Eighth Dist. Court of Appeals, Lecture given at 
Cleveland-Marshall College of Law (Nov. 2, 2006); see also Geyh, supra note 204, at 1475.     
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initiatives to educate the public about the role of the judiciary in general and about 
individual candidates in particular.  
To make public financing work, states’ legislators must ensure a consistent 
stream of revenue.  The best way to do that is to add a nominal, yet compulsory, 
surcharge to initial court filings.  The second potential pitfall is the uncertain 
constitutionality of spending limits on judicial campaigns.  Buckley v. Valeo upheld 
only voluntary spending caps on Presidential candidates who opt-in to public 
financing.213  Because states have a compelling interest in protecting the dwindling 
due process rights of their citizens, this Note concludes that mandatory public 
financing of judicial election campaigns is likely to survive the lower scrutiny that 
judicial campaign contributions merit under the First Amendment.  
V.  CONCLUSION 
Imagine that you are an attorney in one of the following two states in the near 
future.  In State A, candidates for the state’s Supreme Court spend ten million dollars 
on advertising and campaign appearances every two years.  The Republican 
candidate vows at her appearances that she will strike down any law that aids “the 
baby-killers.”  She also proclaims that the state’s business climate is stifled by over-
regulation, and, if elected, she will make sure State A is “open for business.”  Her 
Democratic opponent is a millionaire trial lawyer who stumps for “Big Labor” and 
“the little guy.”  As a result, each candidate is supported by shadowy organizations 
that spend millions of dollars on “issue” advertisements that lambaste the other 
candidate.  You and your colleagues appear regularly before State A’s Supreme 
Court.  Lastly, your administrative assistant has just notified you that “Judge 
Marshall O’Shea is on the other line” and wants to know if he “can count on your 
financial support in the upcoming election?”          
The people of State B voted to maintain an elected judiciary years ago.  
However, due to public awareness campaigns from state and local bar associations, 
there is strong public support for the state’s public financing system for judicial 
elections.  These elections are funded by a $50 surcharge on lawsuits filed in the 
state courts (also cutting down on frivolous suits).  This fund provides $250,000 for 
each party’s high-court candidates to promote their credentials and judicial 
philosophy.  It also provides $2,000,000 for non-partisan public awareness 
campaigns, such as mailing district-specific information about judicial candidates to 
all registered voters.  Judicial candidates enjoy the right to communicate their legal 
philosophies without commenting directly on issues likely to come before the court.  
Such comments are best avoided; otherwise, judges would have to recuse themselves 
down the road.   The people of State B again see judges as “umpires” rather than 
“just politicians.”   
It is hard to predict the future of state judicial elections in the wake of Caperton.  
For every trend showing contested judicial elections may be on the way out,214 there 
                                                                 
213 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 95, 108 (1967). 
214 See James Nash, Moyer Bashes Judicial Fundraising; He also Sees Three Upcoming 
Cases as Standouts in His 22-Year Tenure, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Aug. 13, 2009, at B3 
(detailing speech given by Thomas Moyer, the Chief Justice of the Ohio Supreme Court, in 
which he came down more strongly than ever against contested judicial elections); see also 
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is a counter-trend showing their continued vitality.215  Judicial elections will remain a 
political reality for the foreseeable future.  And, the scope of protected judicial 
speech is expanding.  Such speech will increase many litigants’ uncertainty whether 
their judges are truly impartial.  Litigants’ due process rights are violated when 
judges’ words and actions combine to compromise their impartiality.  Special 
interest money is making full-fledged politicians out of judicial candidates, further 
dashing citizens’ faith in judges as impartial “umpires.”   
To combat this, judges must reclaim the high standards to which they have been 
held in the past.  States have a compelling interest to mandate publicly financed 
judicial elections.  In this battle, states must reclaim the Framers’ doctrine of 
separation of powers for the twenty-first century.  By doing so, they will bring 
judges’ right of free speech and litigants’ due process right to an impartial tribunal 
back into a constitutional balance. 
 
O’Connor’s quest to end contested judicial elections).  “‘Justice is a lot like friendship,’ 
O’Connor said. ‘If you have to pay for it, it’s not worth too much.’”  Id. 
215 See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text. 
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